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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The "Orphan" Parcel: 
This case involves the inadvertent creation of an "orphan" parcel through the mutual 
mistake of the parties' predecessors-in-interest, and the right to use an existing roadway that 
passes through that orphan parcel. 
The common predecessor-in-title of both Regan and Owen are Alexander H. Hargis, Jolm 
W. Acheson, Jr., M. Eileen Acheson, and R. C. Collins who acquired the land that eventually 
became the Regan property and the Owen parcel from BAR-ACH, Inc. under a Deed recorded 
on July 28, 1979. [AR pp. 160-162] R. C. Collins died and March of 1987 and his children, 
Thomas Collins and Judy Baker, were appointed as co-personal representatives of his estate. [AR 
pp.461-462] Prior to the conveyance to Hargis, Acheson and Collins, BAR-ACH commissioned 
a survey of a portion of the Southwest quarter of Section 27, Township 50 North, Range 3 West, 
Boise Meridian, Kootenai County. [Appellants' Brief, Ex. A] This survey, conducted by K.A. 
Durtschi, described and depicted a proposed 60' wide roadway commencing south of Section 27 
at the comer of Bonnell Road and continuing westerly along a gradual curve to the north side of 
the south line of Section 27. 
The centerline legal description of the 60' roadway surveyed by K.A. Durtschi in 1979 
was eventually incorporated into subsequent conveyances by Alexander H. Hargis, John W. 
Acheson, Jr., M. Eileen Acheson, Thomas Collins and Judy Baker (hereafter abbreviated as 
Hargis ef al.) as follows: 
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a. Hart/Honeyman Parcel: In March of 1988, Hargis et al. deeded a parcel located in the 
Southwest Quarter of Section 27 to Patricia H. Hart under a Warranty Deed recorded on 
March 24, 1988 as Kootenai County Instrument No. 1112028. [R pp. 40-42] The 
southern boundary of the parcel conveyed to Patricia Hart was the centerline of the 
roadway surveyed by K. A. Durtschi in 1979. [AR pp. 468-470] In subsequent deeds, 
Patricia Hart held title as Patricia H. Reid and finally as Patricia Honeyman. [R pp. 43-
48] 
b. Smart/Owen Parcel: On November 25, 1988, Hargis et al. deeded the parcel now 
occupied by Owen to Harold and Jean Smart under a Warranty Deed recorded on 
December 28, 1988, as Kootenai County Instrument No. 1137747. The legal description 
incorporated into that Deed used the section line between Sections 27 and 34 as the 
northern boundary of the parcel, and not the curved centerline of the roadway previously 
surveyed by K.A. Durtschi. [AR pp. 463, 471-474]. Smart conveyed the parcel to Cheryl 
Bower in 1994, Bower conveyed the parcel to David and Helen Hanna in 1997, and 
Hanna conveyed the parcel to the appellants, Jeff and Karen Owen, in 2003. [R p. 97] 
c. Johnson Parcel: Only 3 days after the conveyance to Smart, Hargis et al. deeded the 
parcel immediately to the East of the Smart/Owen Parcel to Judith M. Johnson on 
November 28,1988 under a Warranty Deed recorded as Kootenai County Instrument No. 
1137749. The deed to Judith Johnson used the curved centerline of the roadway 
surveyed by K.A. Durtschi as the northern boundary of the conveyed parcel. [AR pp. 
463,475-478] The Johnson parcel was later platted into two lots as the Double J Ranch. 
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d. Doney/Lonam Parcel: In May of 1989, Hargis et al. deeded a parcel located north of the 
Smart/Owen parcel and West of the Patricia Hart parcel to Robert and Debora Doney, 
under a Warranty Deed recorded on June 5, 1989 as Kootenai County Instrument No. 
1150484. Again, Hargis et al. used the centerline of the roadway as surveyed by K.A. 
Durtschi as the southern boundary for the parcel conveyed to Doney. [AR pp. 463, 464, 
479-482] Mr. and Mrs. Doney conveyed their parcel to Joseph and Margarita Lonam in 
June of2000. [R pp. 36-39] 
e. MarchellilRegan property: Finally, Hargis et al. contracted with the Leslie Jean 
Schunemann Marchelli Trust in September of 1989 to sell a portion of the property that is 
now occupied by the respondents, Brent and Moura Regan. The Marchelli Trust 
completed that contract in 1999 and a Warranty Deed to the Trust was recorded on April 
30, 1999 as Kootenai County Instrument No. 1586858. [R pp. 49-66] The centerline of 
the roadway surveyed by K.A. Durtschi in 1979 was used as one of the boundaries for the 
land deeded to the Marchelli Trust and later acquired by Mr. and Mrs. Regan in 1999, 
(described as "Parcel II" in the Warranty Deed from the Marchelli Trust to Regan). [R 
pp.23-25] 
The five parcels identified above surround an "orphan" parcel that was inadvertently 
created when Hargis et al. deeded to the Marchelli Trust in April of 1999. This orphan parcel 
was surveyed at the request of Jeff Owen in July of 20 1 0 and the record of that survey references 
the five Instrument numbers shown above in bold print. [AR p. 460] 
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After the conveyance to the Marchelli Trust in 1999, the Kootenai County Assessor 
assigned a new parcel number (50N03W-27-7160) to the orphan parcel and the County Treasurer 
began to levy property taxes against that parcel. [AR pp. 404,430-434] When the property taxes 
became delinquent, the Kootenai County Treasurer took the orphan parcel under a Tax Deed 
recorded on April 14,2004 as Kootenai County Instrument No. 1869850. [R pp. 67-68] Jeff 
Owen purchased the orphan parcel from Kootenai County and took title under a County Deed 
recorded on November 28,2005 as Kootenai County Instrument No. 1997638. [R pp. 69-70] 
Jeff Owen then deeded the orphan parcel to JeffD. Owen and Karen A. Owen, husband and 
wife, under a Warranty Deed recorded on December 9, 2010 as Kootenai County Instrument No. 
2294085000. On the same day, Jeff and Karen Owen filed a request with the Kootenai County 
Assessor's office to combine the orphan parcel into their existing parcel for assessment purposes. 
[AR pp. 409-412] 
B. The Roadway Easement: 
In the deed from Hargis et al. to Smart in December of 1988, the grantors reserved an 
easement for "roadway and all utility purposes" over the North 30 feet of Smart/Owen parcel for 
the benefit of the grantors and their heirs, successors and assigns. [R pp. 30-32] Similar roadway 
and utility easements were reserved by Hargis et al. in the conveyances to Hart, Johnson, Doney 
and the Marchelli Trust. The thirty foot wide easement reserved over the southern boundary of 
the Hart parcel ran parallel to the thirty foot easement reserved over the north boundary of the 
Johnson parcel. However, the orphan parcel created an unintended gap between the thirty foot 
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easement reserved along the northern boundary of the Smart parcel and the thirty foot easement 
reserved along the southern boundary of the Doney parcel. [AR p. 460J 
An existing gravel roadway extends west from the corner of Bonnell Road to the Regan 
property. That roadway runs approximately along the centerline of the 60' roadway surveyed by 
K.A. Durtschi in 1979. [AR pp. 275,283-285] That roadway existed when Regan purchased the 
Regan property from the Marchelli Trust in March of 1999 and Regan significantly improved the 
roadway later that year by adding more gravel and grading the surface. [AR p. 280J Regan then 
used the improved roadway to bring in heavy equipment and materials for the construction of a 
private airstrip on the Regan property. [May 31,2012 Preliminary Hearing Tr. pp. 22, 27-29] 
The record contains conflicting evidence about exactly when the roadway was first constructed. 
Bruce Anderson, the Kootenai County Surveyor, testified that a roadway existed as early as 1987 
based upon aerial photographs maintained in the Kootenai County Assessor's records. [AR pp. 
319-323] Harold Smart testified that a gravel roadway existed when he and his wife purchased 
the Smart parcel from Hargis et al. in 1988. According to Mr. Smart, that roadway started at the 
comer of Bonnell Road and extended westerly along what Mr. Smart believed to be the northern 
boundary of the parcel that they purchased. [AR pp. 435-440, 448] Patricia Honeyman (Hart) 
testified that no roadway existed when she contracted to purchase her property in 1979. [May 31, 
2012 Preliminary Hearing Tr. p. 200-201] She also testified that an undetermined portion of the 
roadway was built after Judith Johnson purchased her 10 acre parcel in 1988. [May 31, 2012 
Preliminary Hearing Tr. p. 202] 
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After Regan completed the airstrip on the Regan property in 1999, the Regan family 
continued to use the existing roadway to access the Regan property from Bonnell Road. [May 
31,2012 Preliminary Hearing Tr. p. 37] The Regan family continued to use the existing road 
after Owen purchased the Owen parcel and built a residence on that property in 2003. [May 31, 
2012 Preliminary Hearing Tr. pp. 39,40] After Owen acquired the orphan parcel from Kootenai 
County in 2005, the Regan family continued to use the existing roadway to access the Regan 
property from Bonnell Road. [May 31, 2012 Preliminary Hearing Tr. pp. 44, 45] Brent Regan 
also testified that at some point prior to Owen's purchase of the Smart/Owen parcel, a chain gate 
was stretched across the existing roadway at the eastern boundary of the Smart/Owen parcel. At 
that point Regan sought and obtained a legal opinion from a local attorney that confirmed 
Regan's express easement rights to use the existing roadway from Bonnell to access the Regan 
property. [ARp. 660] The chain gate did not deter Regan's use of the roadway. [May 31, 2012 
Preliminary Hearing Tr. pp. 45, 46] 
In March of 20 1 0, Brent Regan made arrangements for a water well to be drilled on the 
Regan property. Regan directed the well drilling company to access the Regan property via the 
existing roadway from Bonnell Road. When the drilling truck arrived at the chain gate, Jeff 
Owen refused to let the truck pass onto the orphan parcel. When Mr. Regan arrived at the chain 
gate, Jeff Owen informed him that the express easement over the north 30 feet of the Owen 
parcel did not provide access to the Regan property from Bonnell Road, and that Regan did not 
have the right to use the existing roadway through the orphan parcel that Owen now owned. [AR 
p. 153; May 31, 2012 Preliminary Hearing Ir. pp. 47-49] In August of 20 10, Regan obtained a 
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building permit from Kootenai County to construct a new residence for his daughter on Parcel II 
ofthe Regan property. The County assigned a Bonnell Road address for this new residence. [AR 
p. 188-189] When Owen continued to refuse access to the Regan property via the existing 
roadway through the orphan parcel, Regan initiated this litigation in March of 20 11. 
In September of2011, Regan moved for partial summary judgment on Regan's claim 
related to the express easement reserved over the north thirty feet of the Owen parcel. The trial 
court granted Regan's motion and entered an order declaring Regan's right to use the easement 
across the north thirty feet of the Owen parcel for roadway and all utility purposes and without 
hindrance or obstruction from Owen. [R p. 76, 77] When Regan attempted to build a new access 
road through the north thirty feet of the Owen parcel, Owen interfered with those efforts and 
Regan filed motions seeking a preliminary injunction to allow Regan to use the existing roadway 
to access the Regan property, and for Owen to be held in contempt for violating the court's 
partial summary judgment Order. [AR p. 172] In May and June of2012, the trial court heard 
testimony on the Regan preliminary injunction motion, and that motion was granted. [R pp. 92-
94] 
In August of2012, Regan filed a second motion for summary judgment on their mutual 
mistake/reformation claim. [AR p. 527] Owen filed a cross motion for summary judgment on 
the same claim [AR pp. 636, 637] and the trial court heard argument on both motions before 
entering a decision and order granting the Regan motion and denying the Owen motion in 
November of2012. [R pp. 95-112] Owen appeals from that decision and order. 
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II. ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
Regan became aware of the existence of the orphan parcel after his conversation with Jeff 
Owen in March of201 O. Prior to that encounter, Regan understood that his property enjoyed 
easement rights over the existing gravel roadway to Bonnell Road, and the Regan family had 
used that road at their convenience during the previous 11 years. When Owen denied Regan's 
easement rights and obstructed the Regan family's use of the existing roadway, Regan had 
reason to investigate the history of the orphan parcel and the parcels located north and south of 
the roadway. That investigation led Regan to conclude that the orphan parcel was the result of a 
mistake in the legal description of the Owen property. Based on two days of testimony and the 
exhibits admitted on the motion for preliminary injunction; and after cross motions for summary 
judgment supported by numerous affidavits, including affidavits from the original seller and 
buyer in the 1988 transaction between Hargis et al. and Smart, the trial court agreed with Regan 
and concluded that: 
1. The Regan claim of mutual mistake was not time barred; 
2. Regan carried the burden to show a mutual mistake in the transaction between Hargis et 
at. and Smart; 
3. Regan was entitled to the remedy of reformation; and 
4. Owen was a bona fide purchaser of the Owen parcel and the orphan parcel, but would not 
be prejudiced by reformation of the Owen legal description. 
For the following reasons, Regan now urges this Court to uphold and affirm the trial 
court's conclusions: 
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B. Owen failed to carry their burden of showing that the mutual mistake claim was 
time barred under I.e. 5-218(4): 
Under I.C. §5-218(4), a cause of action based on mistake does not accrue and the 3-year 
statute does not begin to run "until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting 
the fraud or mistake." This Court has held: "The discovery rule applicable to fraud requires 
more than an awareness that something may be wrong but requires knowledge of the facts 
constituting fraud." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 773, 820 P.2d 360, 368 (1991). Actual 
knowledge of fraud can be inferred if the aggrieved party could have discovered the fraud by the 
exercise of due diligence. This Court has also noted that courts should hesitate to infer 
knowledge of fraud. Id. In Aitken v. Gill, 108 Idaho 900 (Ct.App. 1985), the Court of Appeals 
held that the same principles should apply to claims based on mistake. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals has summarized the law as follows: 
Application of I.C. § 5-218(4) does not depend on when the 
plaintiff should have been aware that something was wrong; as 
used in the statute, "discovery" means the point in time when the 
plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of the facts 
constituting the fraud. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 773, 820 P.2d at 368. 
Actual knowledge will be inferred if the allegedly aggrieved 
party could have discovered the fraud by the exercise of due 
diligence. Nancy Lee Mines, Inc. v. Harrison, 95 Idaho 546, 547, 
511 P.2d 828, 829 (1973); Gerlach v. Schultz, 72 Idaho 507, 514, 
244 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1952); Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 
Idaho 429, 435, 871 P.2d 846, 852 (Ct.App.1994). The question of 
when the plaintiff discovered the fraud is generally a question 
for the jury and summary judgment on the issue is only 
appropriate if there is no factual dispute about when this 
discovery occurred. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 774, 820 P.2d at 369. 
McCorkle v. Northwestern Mutual L(fe Insurance Co., 141 Idaho 550, 554, 112 P. 3d 838, 843 
(Ct.App. 2005). 
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The location, size and configuration of the orphan parcel are reasons to suspect a problem 
with that parcel. By itself, the orphan parcel is 660 feet long but only 30 feet wide at its widest 
point. A roadway runs through the orphan parcel and recorded easements parallel its north and 
south boundaries. While these characteristics make the orphan a strange and undesirable piece 
of land, they do not create actual or constructive knowledge of a mutual mistake. Under the 
legal standards quoted above, the relevant questions are: (a) when did Regan become the 
aggrieved party and (b) when should Regan have discovered the mutual mistake through the 
exercise of due diligence. The record in this case supports the following conclusions. 
It is important to note that the orphan parcel did not exist in the County records when 
Regan purchased from the Marchelli Trust in 1999. A Kootenai County Assessor's map was 
attached to a title insurance commitment prepared for Regan as part of the Marchelli Trust 
transaction. That Assessor's map showed the orphan parcel as part of a larger parcel, #3750 
located in Section 34, south of Section 27. [AR p. 619, 620] At that time, Regan had no reason 
to suspect that there was any problem with that part of parcel #3750. In connection with 
Regan's 1999 purchase transaction, there was nothing in the property records, in the title 
documents or "in view" that would put Regan on notice of a mutual mistake in the Hargis et al. 
to Smart transaction from ten years prior. The orphan parcel was not identified by the County 
and assigned its own parcel number until after Regan purchased from the Marchelli Trust. 
When the chain gate went up across the access road from Bonnell, Regan sought a legal 
opinion regarding the express easement rights contained in his title. When those express 
easement rights were confirmed, Regan was not aggrieved and did not have any reason to 
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investigate further. When the orphan parcel was taken by the County through a Tax Deed in 
2004, and when the orphan was purchased by Owen in 2005, Regan was not aggrieved and had 
no reason to suspect that a mutual mistake had caused the creation of the orphan parcel. It was 
not until March of 20 10, when Regan's use of the roadway through the orphan parcel was 
obstructed by Owen, that Regan became an aggrieved party and had some reason to investigate 
whether Owen's claims were true. Regan did not discover facts indicating that the orphan was 
caused by a mistake until March of2010. [AR pp. 661, 662] Regan filed this action one year 
later; within the 3-year limitation period under I.C. 5-218(4). 
On the Owen motion for summary judgment, Owen carried the burden of showing that 
the Regan claim of mutual mistake was time barred. The trial court correctly concluded that 
Owen failed to prove that affirmative defense and denied Owen's summary judgment motion. 
As they argued below, Owen contends that the recorded documents that existed in 1999 were 
sufficient to put Regan on notice of a mutual mistake in the Hargis et al. to Smart transaction if 
Regan had simply exercised "ordinary care and due diligence." 1 Basically, Owen suggests that 
Regan should have researched the title history of all the properties adjacent to the property that 
Regan was purchasing from the Marchelli Trust in 1999. Obviously this suggestion goes far 
beyond ordinary care and due diligence, and no such duty exists under Idaho law. Regan did 
exercise ordinary care and due diligence by inspecting the property he was purchasing and by 
obtaining a title insurance commitment before buying from the Marchelli Trust. Nothing before 
that purchase gave Regan any reason to suspect a mistake in the history of an adjacent parcel, 
I Appellants' Opening Brief, pg. 25. 
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and circumstances did not give Regan any reason to investigate further until Owen interfered 
with Regan's easement rights in 2010. Because material issues of fact remained on the question 
of when Regan discovered the mutual mistake in the Hargis et al. to Smart transaction, the trial 
court correctly denied the Owen motion for summary judgment. 
In addition to the arguments made below, Owen now asserts that the actual or 
constructive knowledge of Regan's predecessor-in-title should bar Regan's mutual mistake 
claim. Owen claims that Hargis et al. knew or should have known about the mistake in the 1988 
deed to Smart. First, Owen claims that each individual grantor reviewed the legal description in 
the deed to Smart and approved that legal description by their individual signatures. Second, 
Owen notes that the legal description in the Smart deed described the northern boundary as 
running, " ... thence South 89°07'48" East along the North line of said Northwest quarter, a 
distance of 660.00 feet more or less ... " 2 And third, Owen proposes that Hargis et al. had actual 
or constructive notice of the prior surveys showing the alignment of the roadway crossing the 
line separating Sections 27 and 34. Based on these speculations, Owen concludes that Hargis et 
al. should have discovered the mistake in the deed to Smart. 
Unfortunately for Owen, there is no evidence in the record to support any of the 
assumptions upon which Owen's argument is based. In fact, the only evidence before the trial 
court regarding the knowledge or understanding of Hargis et al. comes from the affidavit of 
Thomas Collins, one of the original grantors in the Smart transaction. In his affidavit, Mr. 
Collins states unequivocally that the orphan parcel was supposed to be part of the property 
2 Appellants' Opening Brief, pg. 24. 
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conveyed to Smart in 1988. [AR p. 464] There is no evidence in the record to support Owen's 
claim that Hargis et al. actually read the legal description in the Smart deed, or understood the 
meaning of the bearings and distances described therein. Owen argues that Regan's mutual 
mistake claim should be time barred because Hargis et al. were unable to correctly interpret the 
metes and bounds legal description in the Smart deed. Professional land surveyors are trained 
and licensed to understand and write legal descriptions for real property. Lay grantors in real 
estate transactions are not held to the same standard as a professional surveyor. 
Based on the record before the trial court, and under the standard required by civil rule 
56, the trial court correctly determined that Owen was not entitled to summary judgment on their 
affirmative defense under I.C. 5-218(4). 
C. The orphan parcel was the result of a mutual mistake: 
On the issue of the mutual mistake alleged by Regan, the trial court was presented with 
uncontested affidavits from Thomas Collins, one of the original Hargis et al. grantors, and 
Harold Smart, one of the original grantees to the transaction at issue. Both Collins and Smart 
testified that they intended and assumed the northern boundary of the Smart parcel would be the 
centerline of the roadway as surveyed by K. A. Durtschi in 1979, and not the section line 
dividing Sections 27 and 34. Neither Collins nor Smart knew or had any reason to suspect that 
the northern boundary of the Smart parcel was other than the centerline of the roadway. [AR pp. 
435-460; 461-503] In addition, the trial court had the uncontested affidavit of David English, the 
title officer with Pioneer Title Company who handled the Hargis et al. to Smart transaction in 
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1988. [AR pp. 504-513] Owen presented no evidence to contradict the testimony of Collins, 
Smart or English. Based on this uncontroverted evidence, the trial court concluded that Regan 
carried their burden to show a mutual mistake occurred in the conveyance to Smart in 1988. 
On appeal, Owen now argues that the mistake was not "mutual" because there were no 
direct discussions between Hargis et al. and Smart regarding the location of the northern 
boundary of the property. In Bailey v. Ewing the Court of Appeals addressed this issue and held 
that a mistake must be mutual to constitute grounds for equitable relief. "A mutual mistake 
occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a misconception about a basic 
assumption or vital fact upon which they based their bargain." 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671 P.2d 
1099, 1101 (Ct.App. 1983). The Court of Appeals rejected situations where the parties labor 
under differing misconceptions regarding the same basic assumption or vital fact, and concluded 
that the assumption or fact must be the same, " ... otherwise two unilateral mistakes, instead of 
one mutual mistake, would result." Id. 
The affidavits of Thomas Collins and Harold Smart clearly show that both parties shared 
the same misconception about the same basic assumption or vital fact; that the centerline of the 
roadway marked the location of the northern boundary of the Smart parcel. It was not necessary 
for Collins and Smart to talk to each other for this assumption to be shared. And because the 
record clearly showed that Collins and Smart shared the same assumption about the same vital 
fact, the trial court did not need to infer a mutual mistake. Evidence of the mutual mistake came 
directly from the buyer and seller and there was no evidence in the record to contradict the 
testimony of Collins and Smart on this issue. 
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Finally, Owen argues that the Regan motion for summary judgment should have been 
denied because of conflicting evidence regarding the location or condition of the roadway at the 
time of the Hargis et al. to Smart transaction in 1988. As the ultimate trier of fact in this case, 
the trial court was responsible to resolve conflicting inferences and to arrive at the most probable 
inferences based upon the undisputed evidence before it. P.o. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family 
Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). Based on the uncontroverted 
affidavits of Collins and Smart, the trial court concluded that both buyer and seller assumed the 
northern boundary of the property was the centerline of the existing roadway. Collins testified 
that an unimproved roadway existed in 1988. That roadway started at the corner of Bonnell 
Road and continued westerly roughly along the centerline of the roadway surveyed by K. A. 
Durtschi in 1979. [AR p. 462] Harold Smart also testified that in 1988 an unimproved roadway 
existed from the corner of Bonnell and extended westerly along the northern boundary of the 
parcel that they eventually purchased. In the summer of 1988, Mr. and Mrs. Smart drove over 
that roadway to inspect the property. [AR p. 436] Because both buyer and seller relied upon the 
same existing roadway in making their mistaken boundary assumption, the trial court correctly 
concluded that a mutual mistake occurred in the Hargis et al. to Smart transaction. The 
testimony of other witnesses regarding the location or extent of that roadway over time did not 
create a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment on the mutual mistake 
claim. 
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D. Owen was a bona fide purchaser on inquiry notice of the mutual mistake, and Owen 
suffered no prejudice by reformation of their legal description: 
When an instrument does not reflect the true intentions of the parties because of a mutual 
mistake, a court can reform the instrument unless the reformation will prejudice the rights of 
bona fide and innocent purchasers who did not have notice of the mistake. 
The general rule is that reformation will not be granted if 
it appears such relief will prejUdice the rights of bona fide and 
innocent purchasers. See cases collected in 44 A.L.R. 78 (1926), 
supplemented by 79 A.L.R.2d 1180 (1961). A purchaser must lack 
notice both of the mistake and of the true intent of the parties, 
in order to prevent reformation. Beams v. Werth, 200 Kan. 532, 
438 P.2d 957 (1968). Actual notice however is not required. 
Elwood v. Stewart, 5 Wash. 736, 32 P. 735 (1893). If there are 
circumstances which ought to put a party on inquiry as to 
ownership of property, that party is not considered a purchaser 
without notice and so cannot avoid reformation of the instrument. 
Fajen v. Powlus, 96 Idaho 625, 533 P.2d 746 (1975). Walters v. 
Tucker, 308 S.W.2d 673 (Mo.1957). 
Whether a party is aware of circumstances sufficient to put 
him on inquiry is a question of fact. Pfleuger v. Hopple, 66 
Idaho 152, 156 P.2d 316 (1945). 
Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 641, 671 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Ct.App. 1983). 
On their bona fide purchaser defense, Owen carried the burden of proof. The trial court 
concluded that Owen failed to meet that burden because their purchase of the orphan parcel in 
2005 put them on inquiry notice of a mistake in the 1988 transaction between Hargis et al. and 
Smart. In addition, prior to their purchase in 2003, Owen received a Commitment for Title 
Insurance issued by First American Title Company. That document expressly identified and 
excluded from coverage the 1988 Warranty Deed from Hargis et al. to Smart and the Record of 
Survey commissioned by Smart in December of 1994. [AR pp. 405, ~ 6.] At the time of their 
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purchase in 2003, Owen had actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of the orphan 
parcel, the provisions in the 1988 Warranty Deed to Smart, the 1994 Record of Survey showing 
the centerline of the road and the parallel 30 foot easements, and the provisions in the recorded 
deeds to Hart, Johnson, Doney and the Marchelli Trust. This information was certainly 
sufficient to put Owen on inquiry notice regarding the ownership of the orphan parcel and the 
mistake in the 1988 deed to Smart. 
In addition, the trial court concluded that Owen would not be prejudiced by reformation 
of their legal description to include the orphan parcel. This case presents a unique situation in 
that Owen voluntarily reformed their own legal description when they purchased the orphan 
parcel and requested that the County Assessor combine the orphan with their original parcel in 
December of2010. [ARpp. 409-412] By combining the orphan with their original parcel, Owen 
corrected the mistake that occurred in the original Smart transaction in 1988. The only 
additional change effected by the trial court's Judgment was to move the reserved thirty foot 
easement from the original northern boundary of the Owen parcel to the new northern boundary 
of the orphan parcel. Before reformation, Owen owned a parcel encumbered by a thirty foot 
easement for roadway and utility purposes for the benefit of Regan. After reformation, Owen 
still owned a parcel encumbered by the same easement. Reformation added no burden on the 
Owen property. In fact, reformation actually lessened the burden on the Owen property. Before 
reformation, there was no roadway or utilities within the 30' easement reserved over the Owen 
parcel. After reformation, the reserved 30' easement was reunited with the existing roadway. 
By relocating the easement to the north boundary of the orphan parcel, Owen avoids having a 
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new access road built through their property and avoids having to share a portion of their 
driveway with Regan. These tangible and practical benefits of reformation clearly outweigh or 
mitigate the intangible aesthetic concerns expressed by Owen below. 
It should not be overlooked that the roadway through the orphan parcel existed and was 
in use by Regan when Owen acquired the orphan in 2005. When Owen combined the orphan 
with their other parcel in December of2010, Owen was well aware of Regan's claims to that 
existing roadway. Owen did not purchase pristine, unencumbered property when they 
purchased the orphan parcel. Owen took title to the orphan parcel without warranty and subject 
to any and all existing rights or adverse claims. The trial court correctly concluded that 
reformation would not prejudice Owen's property rights. 
E. Owen's Waiver and Estoppel Defenses: 
Owen misstates the record regarding Regan's claims and actions related to the thirty foot 
easement reserved along the northern boundary of the Owen property. This case was filed 
because Owen refused to acknowledge that Regan had any easement rights across the Owen 
property or orphan parcel. In their complaint, Regan claimed express easement rights across the 
Owen parcel as described in the Owen's chain of title, and Regan sought reformation of Owen's 
title to correct the original mistake that severed the orphan parcel from the Smart parcel in 1988. 
It was necessary and proper for Regan to obtain judicial confirmation of the express easement 
across the Owen property as an essential component of Regan's mutual mistake claim. 
Reforming Owen's title would have no benefit to Regan if Regan did not have confirmed 
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easement rights over the Owen property. From the filing of the complaint through the trial 
court's final Judgment, Regan's claims and position did not change. 
Recall that Regan was trying to build a home for his daughter in the spring of 2010, and 
Owen refused to allow Regan to use the existing access road through the orphan parcel for that 
construction project. After the trial court confirmed the express easement over the north thirty 
feet of the Owen parcel, Regan communicated to Owen's attorney that Regan would prefer to 
use the existing roadway so that Regan would not be forced to build a new road through the 
Owen parcel. [AR p. 189, ~ 5] A similar offer was communicated to Owen's attorney via email 
prior to any road building work on the Owen parcel. [AR p. 186, 187] When Owen refused to 
allow Regan to use the existing roadway through the orphan parcel, Regan attempted to build a 
new access road across the north thirty feet of the Owen parcel. When Owen interfered with 
those efforts as well, Regan halted the road construction and filed a contempt motion against 
Owen. [ARpp. 172,179-181,188-215] 
Owen now claims that Regan should be estopped from seeking reformation of Owen's 
title because of the road construction efforts that Owen forced Regan to start and prevented 
Regan from completing. Owen's estoppel claims simply have no factual basis or legal merit. 
Given the record before the trial court, Owen's estoppel claims were properly ignored. 
F. The trial court's prescriptive easement finding is harmless error: 
Owen correctly notes that the trial court's Decision and Order on the parties' cross 
motions for summary judgment contains the following statement: 
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The Court, then, determined that the Regans enjoy a thirty-foot 
prescriptive easement that runs along the centerline of the 
proposed road. Thus, the Regans have an express easement over the 
northern thirty feet of the OWEN Parcel (the portion that split 
away from the proposed road and runs south of the proposed road), 
and a prescriptive easement over the Orphan Parcel. 
[R p. 99] 
While this statement is inconsistent with the trial court's findings made at the conclusion 
of the preliminary injunction hearing, there is no indication that this prescriptive easement 
finding had any bearing on or relevance to the court's rulings on Regan's mutual mistake claim 
or Owen's affirmative defenses. Because Owen has failed to show, or claim, that this finding 
was prejudicial to them, the trial court's preliminary injunction finding is harmless error. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The orphan parcel at issue in this case was abandoned by Hargis et al. because they 
didn't intend to create it and didn't know it existed. Except in their conveyance to Harold and 
Jean Smart in 1988, Hargis et al. consistently incorporated the centerline of the surveyed 
roadway into the legal descriptions of the parcels that they sold. Hargis et al. also consistently 
reserved easements in those transactions to provide access and utility services for their remaining 
property. Even though the orphan parcel was identified by Kootenai County in 1999, the mutual 
mistake that created the orphan parcel was not discovered by Regan until after Owen acquired 
that parcel and then blocked Regan's use of the existing roadway running through the orphan in 
2010. The trial court received and considered extensive evidence through the various hearings 
and motions that occurred below, and applied the correct standards when it ruled on the parties' 
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cross motions for summary judgment. As the trier of fact, the trial court properly determined 
that Regan was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the mutual mistake and reformation 
claims, and that Owen did not meet their burden of proof on their affirmative defenses. 
For the reasons stated above, Regan respectfully requests that the trial court's decisions 
be affirmed. 
Dated this 1 s( day of November, 2013. 
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